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a mechanically defective recording of a confession or admission. Its
suggestions should prove valuable to courts which have not yet passed
on the question:
"To insure the accused of the absolute protection of his rights
to which he is entitled under the charitable policy of our criminal
laws, and assuming that the voluntary character and the accuracy
of the recording device has been established, we make the fol-
lowing suggestions as to trial procedure in the event an objection
is interposed to the introduction of a recorded statement on the
grounds that such statement is inaudible, or contains illegal, ir-
relevant, incompetent, or immaterial evidence.
"The trial court should first have the recording played or run
off before it out of the presence of the jury, counsel being afforded
the opportunity at this time of interposing appropriate objec-
tions. A transcription of the audible portions of the statement
should of course be made at this time.
"If either of such defects infect the recording there can be
doubt as to its admissibility.
"If the recording is inaudible in those portions likely to con-
tain statements material to the issues, the recording should be
rejected if it is the only evidence offered as to the statement.
"Since most recordings are in question and answer form, the
question itself will shed light on the probable materiality of the
answer.
"If the parties who were present when the recording was
made are available and testify as to the statements made, the
recording, even though inaudible, in parts, should be admitted
as corroborative of the testimony of the witness or witnesses
testifying to the statement....
"If the recording contains illegal evidence it should be re-
jected unless such illegal portions can be erased from the tape, or
kept from the jury by stopping and starting the playing instru-
ment. This for the reason, as before stated, we doubt the effec-
tiveness of oral instructions to eradicate the prejudicial effect of
this type of evidence because of its inherent potency."
24
WILLIAm E. ZIMTBAUM.
Federal jurisdiction-Suits Against a State
A recent case, Lowes v. Manhattan City School District,' presents
some of the problems facing a federal court when it concludes the suit
2
'Id. at 73-74.
'222 F. 2d 258 (9th Cir. 1955).
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before it is one against a state. In the Lowes case plaintiff brought an
action for damages in a federal district court of California, alleging that
defendants had wrongfully taken possession of real property to which
she was entitled, had wrongfully removed a building therefrom, and had
converted certain personal property belonging to plaintiff. She assigned
diversity of citizenship as grounds for jurisdiction.2  Plaintiff was a
resident of Alaska ;3 defendants were the named California school dis-
trict and certain individuals. The district judge dismissed the com-
plaint on his own motion for want of complete diversity, because a state
is not a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and the school dis-
trict was a part of the government of the state. The district judge also
held the complaint alleged no federal question. 4  On appeal the court
of appeals affirmed as to diversity, because the action against the school
district was in effect a suit against the state. But it reversed the dis-
trict court on the matter of a federal question, finding that the alleged
acts of the individual defendants constituted an invasion of plaintiff's
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At various times in the history of the federal court system at least
three possible grounds have been presented for jurisdiction over suits
against a state by a citizen of another state: (1) jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship; (2) jurisdiction based on section 13 of the
judiciary Act of 1789 ;5 and (3) jurisdiction based on a federal question.
The district court and the court of appeals correctly concluded in the
Lowes case that a state is not a citizen within the meaning of the judici-
ary acts granting federal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship.6 The United States Supreme Court at an early date held that a
2 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (1952) provides that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000
and is between citizens of different states.
3 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (b) supra note 2, provides that the word "State" shall
include the Territories and the District of Columbia.
'28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1952) provides that the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds
$3,000 and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
"... the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of
a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its citizens;
and except also between a state and citizens of other states ... in which latter case
it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction." The Judiciary Act of 1789,§ 13, 1 STAT. 80.
0 State Highway Commission v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U. S. 194 (1928);
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Hickman, 183 U. S. 53 (1901); Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. United States, 155 U. S. 482 (1894), (sub. norn.) Postal
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430 (1886).
See, generally, Annot., 147 A. L. R. 786 (1943).
Counties and municipal corporations are treated as citizens of their states for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 530(1890) ; Pearl River County v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 270 Fed. 26 (5th Cir. 1921) ;
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. Ry., 255 U. S. 236 (1921); see Board of
Levee Commissioners of Orleans Levee District v. Huse, 17 F. 2d 785 (E. D. La.
1927).
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state cannot in the nature of things be a citizen of itself.7 Therefore a suit
between a state and a citizen of another state is not a suit between
citizens of different states, and, on this ground, the courts have no
jurisdiction.8 It is not necessary for the state to be a formal party to
constitute a suit against the state.0 For example, in suits against state
officials or agencies, the state may nevertheless be the real party in
interest;1° such suits are held to be in effect against the state," and
therefore there is no diversity of citizenship. It was on this point that
it was held there was no diversity in the Lowes case.
In the celebrated case of Chisholm v. Georgia,1 2 the Supreme Court
held that the federal court had jurisdiction over a civil suit against the
state of Georgia by a citizen of South Carolina, brought under section
13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Adverse reaction of the states to this
exercise of jurisdiction culminated in the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment. 13  Its provisions effectively bar any action 14 against 8 a
state by a citizen of another state,' 6 except in those cases where the
state has waived its immunity.'7 It was said in Osborn v. Bank,'8 that
Stone v. South Carolina, supra note 6, at 430.
s See note 6, supra.
'Pacific Fruit & Lumber Produce Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission,
41 F. Supp. 175 (D. Ore. 1941) ; cf. Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. S. 436 (1908).
1 State Highway Commission v. Utah Const. Co., 278 U. S. 194 (1928);
Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. v. Hickman, 183 U. S. 53 (1901); Chicago,
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Long, 181 F. 2d 295 (8th Cir. 1950); State Highway Commis-
sion v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 81 F. 2d 689 (8th Cir. 1936).
"' See note 10 supra. Of course it does not always follow that in a particular
suit the state is in fact the real party in interest. Where the suit is against an
officer in his individual capacity, e.g., Porter v. Beha, 12 F. 2d 513, 517 (2d Cir.
1926); Weiland v. Pioneer Irr. Co., 239 Fed. 519 (8th Cir. 1916), aff'd. 259
U. S. 498 (1922) ; (compare with California ex rel. McColgan v. Bruce, 129 F. 2d
421 (9th Cir. 1942) and Craig v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 125 F. 2d 66 (5th
Cir. 1942)); or is against an agency, which because of its powers, e.g. Hunkin-
Conkey Const. Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 34 F. Supp. 26 (M. D.
Penn. 1940) ; may be recognized as a separate entity, the requisite citizenship may
be found, and jurisdiction taken. See Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Hickman,
183 U. S. 53 (1901); Missouri v. Homesteaders Life Ass'n., 90 F. 2d 543 (8th
Cir. 1937) ; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Farnsworth, 74 F. 2d 910 (5th Cir.
1935) ; Porter v. Beha, 12 F. 2d 513 (2d. Cir. 1926) ; Barton v. Delaware River
Joint Toll Bridge Commission, 120 F. Supp. 337 (D. N. 3. 1954).
122 U. S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
" "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U. S. CoxsT. amend. XI.
" By construction, the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits in admiralty
against a state. In re State of New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921).
1" The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits by states against citizens
of the same or another state. Southern Pacific Ry. v. California, 118 U. S. 109
(1886).
" The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits in the federal courts against
states by citizens of the same state. Hans. v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1901).
17 Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436 (1882) ; Gunter v. Atlantic Coastline Ry.,
200 U. S. 273 (1905). It was said that whenever a citizen of another state could
go into a state court in an action against a state, a citizen of another state could
go into a federal court in a similar action. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust
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the Eleventh Amendment prohibited only those suits wherein the state
was a formal party to the record. 19 However, this restricted rule was
later modified to include within the operation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment actions wherein the state was not a formal party but was the real
party in interest, against whom relief was sought.20
Although the Eleventh Amendment was adopted primarily to pre-
clude jurisdiction over suits of the Chisholm v. Georgia class, it is not
so limited. The Eleventh Amendment also prohibits suits against a
state by a citizen of another state where the plaintiff bases his claim
for relief on a federal question. 21 This is the result even though plain-
tiff asserts a violation by the state of his constitutional rights.2 2 Since
the Eleventh Amendment applies to suits where the state is the real
party in interest, it prohibits suits against state agencies or officers act-
ing in their official capacity where a judgment for the plaintiff would
operate against or would require affirmative action by the state, even
though the state was not a formal party to the record.2
In the Lowes case the court of appeals did not recognize an Eleventh
Amendment problem. The explanation lies, perhaps, in the fact that
on the issue of a federal question the court was addressing itself to the
question of possible liability of the individual defendants. The Eleventh
Amendment has been construed not to apply to suits against state
officials who have acted or threaten to act under color of an unconsti-
tutional statute,24 or who have acted or threatened to act unconstitu-
Co., 154 U. S. 362, 391 (1893). But now the rule is clearly otherwise; a state
may limit suits against itself to actions in its own courts. Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. State Tax Commission, 327 U. S. 573 (1946); Ford Motor Co. v. De-
partment of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 465 (1945); Great Northern Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
"' 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
"Old. at 857.
"0 "As to what is deemed to be a suit against a state, the early suggestion that
the inhibition might be confined to those in which the state was a party to the
record . . . has long since been abandoned, and it is now established that the
question is to be determined not by the mere names of the titular parties but by
the essential nature and effect of the proceedings as it appears from the entire
record." In re State of New York, 256 U. S. 490, 500 (1921); In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443 (1887).
2" Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Tax Commission, 327 U. S. 573 (1946).
22 Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933) ; Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v.
Oregon Liquor Control Commission, 21 F. Supp. 822 (D. C. Ore. 1941). cf. Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 10 (1901).
" "Accordingly it is well settled that a suit against officers of a state, to compel
them to do acts which constitute a performance by it of its contracts, is, in effect,
a suit against the state itself." Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 9 (1891).
An action is against the state not only when it will be required to specifically
perform its contracts, but will be required to make pecuniary satisfaction for any
liability. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900).
4 Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917), Truax v.
Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U. S.
146 (1910), Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 211 U. S. 201 (1908); Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 (1891).
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tionally under a constitutional statute.25  The theory of these cases is
that such suits are not against state officers in their official capacity, but
rather are suits against such persons for their individual wrongs.20 An
action of this type is not against the state,2 7 and therefore a federal court
has jurisdiction to grant either legal28 or equitable20 relief.
In the light of the foregoing, if the court of appeals was correct in
finding that the suit against the school district was in effect a suit against
the state, and therefore there was no diversity of citizenship, must not
a suit against the school district for its alleged violation of plaintiff's
constitutional rights also be a suit against the state? It is submitted
that the answer to this question is in the affirmative. If this be so, then
it seems logical to conclude, absent a showing of waiver by the state of
its immunity, that the court was without jurisdiction over the subject
matter on the basis of a federal question because of the prohibitions of
the Eleventh Amendment. This would appear to be the result so long as
the school district remained a party, even though the court might validly
determine that the district court otherwise could exercise jurisdiction
over the wrongs committed by the individual defendants.
To avoid this complication in the Lowes type case, it is suggested
that the better analytical approach to the problem is the method adopted
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in O'Neil
v. Early.3° In that case the court, before ruling on diversity of citizen-
ship or a federal question, first determined whether the suit was one
prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment; that is, whether the suit was
"2 "Neither will the constitutionality of the statute, if that be conceded, avail to
oust the federal court of jurisdiction. A valid law may be wrongfully administered
by officers of the state, and so as to make such administration an illegal burden
and exaction upon the individual." Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 154
U. S. 362, 399 (1894). See also, Sterling v. Constantine, 287 U. S. 378 (1932) ;
Louisville & N. Ry. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). But see Barney v. City
of New York, 193 U. S. 430 (1904), where it was held that when the action
of the state official was contrary to law, and therefore unauthorized, it was not
action of the state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and there-
fore, on that ground, there was no federal question. But see, also, Isseks, Juris-
diction of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State
Officials, 40 HARv. L. REv. 969 (1927), where the author discusses the Barney
Case and its apparent subsequent repudiation.
" See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
27 Ibid.
"8 Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 (1897). See McCartney v. West Virginia,
156 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946).
2 Louisville & N. Ry. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917) ; Caldwell v. Siouxe Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ;
Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline Ry., 211 U. S. 201 (1908) ; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) ; McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U. S. 543 (1906) ; Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894) ; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S.
1 (1891).
" 208 F. 2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953). Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Co-
lumbia, brought an action against a Virginia county superintendent of schools
and a county school board for damages for wrongful discharge from her job as
school teacher.
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against the state, and, if so, whether the state had waived its immunity.
Upon finding that the suit was against the state and that the state had
not waived its immunity, the court dismissed the suit. It was unneces-
sary to rule on the question of diversity or federal question jurisdiction.
In cases where the Eleventh Amendment has been waived by the state,
jurisdiction can never be based on diversity of citizenship, but juris-
diction may be exercised on grounds of a federal question provided the
complaint properly alleges that the suit arises under the United States
Constitution, a federal statute or treaty.
If the court of appeals in the Lowes case was correct in holding
there was liability on the part of certain individual parties because of
their violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, then it is submitted
that the school district should have been dismissed as a party.31 In
that event the Eleventh Amendment would be no obstruction to the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction. However, so long as the school district re-
mained a party, it would seem that the court would have no jurisdiction
on any grounds.
LowRY M. BETTs.
Real Property-Recordation of Federal Condemnation Judgments in
the County of the Condemned Land
The recent federal case of United States v. Norman Lumber Co.1
has presented to attorneys still another obstacle to overcome in the
long road of searching titles. This was an action brought by the federal
government to determine title to certain lands and to recover the value
of timber removed therefrom. In federal condemnation proceedings
2
in 1936 certain lands in Montgomery County, North Carolina were
condemned. One Bruton and his heirs, the owners of the property here
in question, were made parties to those proceedings. The judgment
was docketed and cross-indexed in the office of the clerk of the United
States district court, and docketed, indexed and cross-indexed in the
office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Montgomery County, North
Carolina, but in the latter the names of the Bruton heirs did not appear.
The judgment was not registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
of Montgomery County, although the judgment by its terms required
that this be done. In 1951 the Bruton heirs executed a timber deed
to the Norman Lumber Company who then began to remove the tim-
ber from the property in suit.
31 See McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F. 2d 739 (4th Cir. 1946).
'United States v. Norman Lumber Co., 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955),
aff'd, 223 F. 2d 868 (4th Cir. 1955).
'United States v. 1053.2 acres of land in Montgomery County, North Carolina.
[As cited in the District Court opinion, 127 F. Supp. 518 (M. D. N. C. 1955).]
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